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II. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of an 
appeal from an order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Miningtpursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iv)(Supp. 1990). 
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
This brief will make repeated reference to the 
following pleadings, transcripts, names, statutes, parties, 
wells, orders, and certain oil and gas terms: 
"Act" or "Forced Pooling Statute" is the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988) (Addendum D), 
which mandates forced pooling and nonconsent penalties, and which 
allows more than one well to be producing in a drilling unit; 
"Altamont/Bluebell Field" is an oil and gas field in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah, which has been spaced for 640 
acre drilling units for the Lower Green River/Wasatch Formations; 
"ANR" is ANR Production Company, the Petitioner below 
and the Appellee or Respondent on appeal; 
"Bennion" is Sam H. Bennion, the Respondent below and 
the Appellant or Petitioner on appeal; 
The "Board" is the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, of the 
Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining; 
"consenting parties" means those companies or parties 
who elect to invest money in the drilling of an oil and gas well 
and who have the right to drill such an oil and gas well pursuant 
to their ownership of an oil and gas lease or unleased mineral 
interest. 
"Drilling Unit11 is the drilling (spacing) unit 
established for Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah 
Special Meridian, Duchesne County, Utah, an irregular section 
containing 678.2 acres; 
"Index" followed by a page number shall refer to the 
Index of Record as filed with this Court; 
"Miles Well" is the Miles 2-1B5 Well located in the 
Drilling Unit and is the increased density well (the second well) 
drilled on the Drilling Unit; 
"nonconsenting parties" are those companies or 
individuals who do not elect to invest money in the drilling of 
an oil and gas well even though they have the right to drill such 
an oil and gas well pursuant to their ownership of an oil and gas 
lease or unleased mineral interest. 
"nonconsent penalty" means the percentage of the 
nonconsenting parties1 share of costs that the consenting parties 
may recover out of the nonconsenting parties' share of oil and 
gas produced from a well. A 100% nonconsent penalty means that 
the consenting parties may recover from production only the 
nonconsenting parties' share of costs. A 175% nonconsent penalty 
means that the consenting parties may recover from production the 
nonconsenting parties1 share of the costs plus an additional 75% 
of those costs. 
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"Order" is the order of the Board in Docket No. 90-021, 
Cause 139-63 (Addendum A), dated September 20, 1990, which is the 
subject of this appeal; 
"1981 Order" is the order of the Board in Cause 139-13 
(Addendum B), dated April 30, 1981, which force pooled the 
Drilling Unit; 
"1985 Order" is the order of the Board in Docket No. 
85-007, Cause No. 139-42 (Addendum C), dated April 17, 1985, 
which allowed for two producing wells in each drilling unit in 
the Altamont/Bluebell Field; 
"Tew Well" is the Tew 1-1B5 Well located in the 
Drilling Unit and is the first well drilled on the Drilling Unit; 
"TR" followed by a page reference shall refer to the 
transcript of the hearing held before the Board on May 24, 1990; 
"1985 TR" is the transcript of the hearing before the 
Board on the issue of increased density (reflected in the 1985 
Order); 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Is Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), constitutional 
in that it authorizes the Board to issue orders allowing 
consenting owners to recoup from production of oil and gas 
attributable to nonconsenting owners 150% to 200% of drilling and 
completion costs? 
While this issue may be one of first impression by this 
Court, similar statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions 
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as a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the state to 
bring to pass the objectives of the various states to (i) prevent 
waste, and (ii) to protect the correlative rights of all of the 
mineral interest owners within a designated drilling unit. See 
for example the Syllabus by the Court in Anderson v. Corporation 
Commission, 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1958), where the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court said: 
A statute authorizing the Corporation 
Commission to regulate production of oil and 
gas so as to prevent waste and to secure 
equitable apportionment among owners of the 
leasehold interest of the oil and gas 
underlying their land, and to fairly 
distribute among them, the costs of 
production and of the apportionment is a 
proper exercise of the police power and does 
not violate the provisions of the State or 
Federal Constitutions. Id. at 700. 
B. Was Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), properly 
applied by the Board in its order allowing ANR, the operator of 
the Miles Well and the other nonconsenting parties, to recoup 
175% of Bennion's share of the drilling and completion costs? 
The Order is fair and reasonable as applied to Bennion. 
Other parties in the drilling unit who were signatories to the 
Joint Operating Agreement ("JOA"), had contractually obligated 
themselves to be subject to a 300% nonconsent penalty in the 
event they chose not to participate in the Miles Well. In 
addition, the nonconsenting parties under the JOA did not receive 
a royalty until payout was achieved. Bennion, on the other hand, 
receives a royalty equal to average royalty being paid to other 
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land owners in the Drilling Unit who have leased their mineral 
interest (at least l/8th of production), and, upon payout from 
production of 1.75 times of his share of the drilling and 
completion costs, he will participate at 8/8ths of his interest 
in the Drilling Unit, subject only to paying his proportionate 
share of the ongoing costs of production. The 175% nonconsent 
penalty is not only fair, it is much more favorable to Bennion 
than to anyone else holding interests in the section. 
C. Does the Board have the authority to amend its 
orders from time to time as circumstances change? 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-^ 6-6 (1988), provides in part: 
(2) The Board may modify the order to 
provide an exception to the authorized 
location of a well when the Board finds such 
a modification to be reasonably necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling 
units for a pool shall cover all lands 
determined by the Board to be underlain by 
the pool, and the order may be modified by 
the Board to include additional areas 
determined to be underlain by the pool. 
(4) . . . The Board may modify the 
order to decrease or increase the size of 
drilling units or permit additional wells to 
be drilled within the established units. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Between the time of the 1981 Order and the hearing in 
this matter on May 24, 1990, the Act was amended in 1983 and the 
Board had issued an order affecting this and other lands in the 
Altamont/Bluebell Field allowing for two producing wells in each 
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drilling unit (1985 Order). Clearly, the Board had the authority 
to amend the 1981 Order. 
D. Did ANR have an obligation to petition the Board 
for the right to drill the Miles Well? 
The 1985 Order provides: 
C. Additional wells may be drilled at 
the option of the operator of the unit, based 
upon geologic and engineering data for that 
unit which will justify the drilling of an 
additional well in order to recover 
additional oil, provided the additional well 
appears to be economically feasible. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Transcript of the hearing for the 1985 Order makes 
it clear that Board does not want to be in the business of 
reviewing drilling applications on the basis of economic factors 
every time a second well is drilled within an existing unit. 
CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: We tried to incorporate what we 
think is the existing condition now, which is a prudent 
operator standard. (1985 TR, page 258). 
This is not to suggest that applications for permits to 
drill are no longer filed for administrative approval to the Utah 
Department of Natural Resources. The Board, however, felt that 
all else being equal, an application for a permit to drill a 
second well should not be treated any differently than the 
application for the first well, and would not require Board 
approval. 
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E. Should the Court accept the findings of fact of 
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining as being supported by 
"substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the Court"? 
The standard of appellate review is set forth in the 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22 
(1989). Section 63-46b-16(4) states: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant 
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is 
based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that 
is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
F. Should the Court should give deference to the 
conclusions of the Board based on the Board's findings of facts, 
that Bennion be subject to a 175% nonconsent penalty in the 
Drilling Unit? 
The Administrative Procedures Act has been reviewed by 
the Court most recently in the case of First National Bank of 
Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 
P.2d 1163 (1990), where "substantial evidence" under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) was defined as ". . . that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
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reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 799 P.2d 1163, 1165. 
See also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), authorizes the Board to 
impose a nonconsent penalty of (i) 100% of the costs of the 
surface equipment beyond the wellhead, (ii) 100% of the operating 
costs since the date of first production, and (iii) 150% to 200% 
of the drilling and completion costs to be recouped from 
production of those parties who do not participate financially in 
the drilling of an oil well. This case is simply to determine if 
a mineral interest owner, who doesn't lease his land and who 
otherwise has not consented to the proposed well, is subject to 
the nonconsent penalty. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. ANR 
filed a Request For Agency Action with the Board on April 10, 
1990, seeking an order specifying the percentage of costs to be 
recovered by all consenting owners of the Miles Well before 
Bennion, as a nonconsenting owner, is entitled to receive his 
share of production. The Board, after considering all of the 
evidence offered at a hearing in the matter on May 24, 1990, and 
after reviewing briefs submitted the parties, ordered, on August 
23, 1990, that prior to Bennion being able to receive proceeds 
from the Miles Well other than a royalty, the consenting owners 
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must recover from his share of the production, (i) 100% of the 
costs of the surface equipment beyond the wellhead, (ii) 100% of 
the operating costs since the date of first production, and (iii) 
175% the drilling and completion costs of the Miles Well 
(hereinafter called a "175% nonconsent penalty). The Order was 
later reduced to writing on September 20, 1990. On October 12, 
1990, Bennion filed a Petition for Review of Administrative 
Action with this Court. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), is constitutional 
because it is a legitimate exercise of the State of Utah's police 
power to "foster, encourage, and promote the development, 
production and utilization" of Utah's oil and gas resources. By 
imposing nonconsent penalties within the Drilling Unit, the 
Board, under the Act, is preventing wasteland protecting the 
correlative rights of all of the mineral interest owners. 
B. The Act has been constitutionally applied in this 
case by the Board since the consenting parties are recouping a 
fair and reasonable amount from Bennionfs share of the production 
which is less than from any other lessor or working interest 
owner in the Drilling Unit. He has not been singled out by the 
Board or the operator, ANR, for special treatment. 
C. It was appropriate for the Board to amend the 1981 
Order. The Board has the authority under the Act to amend its 
orders as circumstances change. The changes of the Act in 1983, 
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the Order of the Board in 1985, and the proposal to drill the 
Miles Well in 1990 have made the 1981 Order obsolete in defining 
the relationship among the interest owners in the Drilling Unit. 
Also, Bennion, through his actions, has waived his claim that the 
1981 Order cannot be amended. 
D. There is nothing in the 1985 Order which would have 
required or even allowed ANR to petition the Board for the right 
to drill the Miles Well. The 1985 Order made it clear that the 
decision to drill a second well was up to the operator. 
E. The Court should not disturb the findings of the 
Board since the findings were,adequately supported by the record. 
Appellant has not made reference to any portion of the record 
below to support Bennion*s contention that the Board had an 
inadequate basis for its findings. The legal conclusion of the 
Board that Bennion should be subject to the 175% nonconsent 
penalty is based on findings of the Board which were sufficient 
as a matter of law to make its legal conclusions. The Board 
consists of highly qualified members who have experience in oil 
and gas matters. The Court should give weight to the expertise 
of the Board in reviewing its findings. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE FORCED POOLING STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hunter Co. v. 
McHuqh, 320 U.S. 222, 64 S.Ct. 19, held that: 
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. . . a state has constitutional power 
to regulate production of oil and gas so as 
to prevent waste and to secure equitable 
apportionment among landowners of the 
migratory gas and oil underlying their land, 
fairly distributing among them the costs of 
production and of the apportionment. 
Id. at 21. 
While this issue may be one of first impression by this 
Court, similar statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions 
as a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the state to 
bring to pass the objectives of the various states to (i) prevent 
waste, and (ii) to protect the correlative rights of all of the 
mineral interest owners within a designated drilling unit. "The 
constitutionality of compulsory pooling statutes has been 
sustained so generally that no reasonable question on this score 
remains." H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §905.1 
(1990 Edition). 
The case of Anderson v. Corporation Commission, 327 P.2d 699 
(Okla. 1958), is a good example of legal authority upholding 
statutes which regulate the creation and participation in 
drilling units for oil and gas. In Anderson, the court was asked 
to pass on the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute which 
required a mineral interest owner to accept a bonus payment (set 
by the commission) if he chose not participate in the drilling of 
the unit well. Upon receipt of the bonus, the mineral interest 
owner forfeits any further working interest or right to 
participate in the unit. In reaching its holding that the 
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statute was a constitutional exercise of police power, the court 
reviewed the public policy and the balancing of interests which 
it felt supported the state action. 
To curtail over-production and waste for 
the benefit and protection of the general 
public, restraints had to be placed around 
the individualf s rights to develop and 
produce beyond the demand or need. The only 
logical method of restraint, other than 
limitation of production per well, was the 
curtailment of drilling by exercise of the 
police power. There evolved the well spacing 
laws. But, with well spacing alone, the 
object of curtailment was met, although often 
at the expense of serious inequalities and 
inequities between the various mineral owners 
and lessees. . . . Thus consideration of the 
correlative rights of such owners and lessees 
became a necessary part of the legislation. 
The results were the acts authorizing 
unitization and pooling in each common source 
of supply in order that the exercise of the 
police power in the conservation of natural 
resources would not effect too serious an 
unbalancing of correlative rights. 
Id. at 701. 
The issue in the Anderson case is not any different than the 
constitutional issue raised by Bennion. Both ANR and Bennion had 
to give up something in order to get something. ANR has to pay 
Bennionfs share of costs and to share proceeds from the Miles 
Well in return for being allowed to drill an additional well on 
the Drilling Unit. Bennion has to be subject to a modest 
nonconsent penalty in return for receiving a royalty and standing 
on the sideline and watching the well go down at no cost or risk 
to him. As the court in Anderson observed: 
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All property is held subject to the 
valid exercise of the police power; nor are 
regulations unconstitutional merely because 
they operate as a restraint upon private 
rights of person or property or will result 
in loss to individuals. The infliction of 
such loss is not a deprivation of property 
without due process of law; the exertion of 
police power upon subjects lying within its 
scope, in a proper and lawful manner, is due 
process of law. 
Id. at 702 (quoting from Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 
475, 478). 
The Forced Pooling Statute in Utah is much more 
favorable to the nonconsenting landowner than the Oklahoma 
statute. Bennion does not lose his right to his working interest 
in the Drilling Unit for all time. If the Oklahoma statute has 
withstood constitutional attack, the Utah Act should also be 
found to pass constitutional muster. 
In addition to Oklahoma, other state courts have found 
that a state has constitutional power to regulate production of 
oil and gas so as to prevent waste and to secure equitable 
apportionment among mineral property owners. See Hunter v. 
Justice's Court of Centinela Tp.. 223 P.2d 465 (Calif. 1950), and 
Svlvania Corporation v. Kilborne, 271 N.E.2d 524 (N.Y. 1971). 
The purpose of a nonconsent penalty is to balance the 
risks and benefits of drilling an oil and gas well between the 
parties agreeing to invest substantial sums of money in drilling 
an oil and gas well and the parties that refuse to invest any 
money. The parties that agree to pay for the cost of drilling a 
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well face real risks that they may not make any money on their 
investment. In fact, they may not recover part or all of their 
investment. A well may be a dry hole, the cost of drilling may 
exceed all expectations, production may be insufficient to pay 
the cost of the well or prices may drop. 
The parties that do not agree to invest their money do 
not face these risks. If the well is dry, the nonconsenting 
parties do not pay a penny. If the well is productive they will 
claim a substantial benefit by having a producing well on their 
property. 
There is a large incentive for a party to become a 
nonconsenting party if there is no nonconsent penalty. There is 
also a large incentive for a party to refuse to agree to pay 
another partyfs share of the cost of drilling a well if there is 
no nonconsent penalty. By drilling a well the consenting parties 
are bestowing a potentially valuable asset on the nonconsenting 
party at a risk to themselves but at no risk to the nonconsenting 
party. Without a nonconsent penalty a nonconsenting party would 
receive all of the benefits of the drilling of the well and face 
none of the risks. The nonconsent penalty is one method of 
balancing the risks and benefits of drilling the well. 
The Utah Legislature has examined the issue of 
consenting and nonconsenting parties and enacted a statute, the 
Forced Pooling Statute, that balances the risks and benefits of 
drilling a well between the consenting and nonconsenting parties. 
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Under the Forced Pooling Statute the consenting parties are 
obligated to pay all of the cost of drilling the well including 
the costs attributable to the nonconsenting parties1 interests. 
The nonconsenting parties are not liable for any portion of the 
cost of drilling a well. If the well is successful, and only if 
the well is successful, then the consenting parties may begin to 
recoup the costs attributable to the nonconsenting parties' 
interests from the production attributable to such interests. 
The consenting parties are required to pay the nonconsenting 
parties a royalty equal to the average royalty in the unit until 
the nonconsent penalty is paid out. To remove the disincentive 
to drilling that the consenting parties face by having to pay the 
nonconsenting parties1 share of the costs, the Utah Legislature 
has mandated that the consenting parties be allowed to recover 
from production (i) 100% of the costs of the surface equipment 
beyond the wellhead, (ii) 100% of the operating costs since the 
date of first production, and (iii) 150% to 200% of the drilling 
and completion costs. To compensate them, the nonconsenting 
parties receive a royalty, plus they are entitled to have the 
benefit of a well once the nonconsent penalty is recovered from 
production. 
This recovery allowed by the Forced Pooling Statute is 
commonly referred to as a nonconsent penalty. It should be noted 
that a 100% nonconsent penalty would only allow the consenting 
parties to recover out of production 100% of the costs 
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attributable to the nonconsenting parties. A 175% nonconsent 
penalty allows the consenting parties to recover out of 
production such costs, plus 75% of such costs as compensation for 
agreeing to pay for the costs of the well. The practice in 
industry usually calls for nonconsent penalties ranging from 200 
to 300 percent for development wells, at least 300 percent for 
most exploratory (wildcat) wells, and in very expensive areas, 
particularly offshore operations, as much as 1,000 percent. 
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS (6th Edition, 
1984). 
It should also be noted that the nonconsenting parties 
do not "pay" for the cost of the well in any traditional sense of 
the word. The nonconsenting parties are not required to pay any 
cash or write a check. If the well is not productive then the 
nonconsenting parties are not liable for any of the drilling 
costs. If the well is productive then the consenting parties are 
entitled to receive the production attributable to the 
nonconsenting partiesf interests until they recoup the 
nonconsenting parties' share of such costs. The nonconsenting 
parties do receive a royalty. 
Bennion's claims that he must "pay" a 175% penalty are 
somewhat misleading. Bennionfs claim that he would have to pay 
175% of his costs and receive nothing if the well is not 
productive enough, (Bennion Brief at 14), is incorrect for two 
reasons. First, Bennion?s nonconsent penalty is recovered only 
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out of production. If the well is not productive enough to allow 
the consenting owners to recover the full 175% penalty, then 
Bennion will not have to "pay" any portion of the remainder of 
the 175% penalty. Second, Bennion is paid a royalty if there is 
any production. In addition, Bennionfs claim that his nonconsent 
penalty is higher than anyone else's (Bennion Brief at 13) is 
also incorrect. Mr. Dave Laramie testified that in excess of 
three companies elected not to participate in the Miles Well and 
those companies would be subject to a 300% nonconsent penalty. 
(TR, page 22). 
On balance, the Forced Pooling Statute is a legitimate 
exercise of the State's police power to regulate the production 
of oil and gas in Utah. The correlative rights of Bennion and 
ANR and the other consenting parties are being protected, and the 
State's interests in the conservation and prevention of waste are 
being served. 
B. THE NONCONSENT PENALTY ALLOWED UNDER THE ACT IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE. 
It is difficult to understand Bennion's claim that his 
circumstances are so unique that the nonconsent penalty is 
unconstitutional as applied to him. If a nonconsent penalty is 
constitutional on its face then Bennion must show that the 
statute has been applied in an unconstitutional manner. 
Bennion appears to assert that since he had a vested 
property right then it is unconstitutional to impose a nonconsent 
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penalty. Every mineral leasehold owner and unleased mineral 
interest owner in a unit, however, has a vested property right. 
If the nonconsent penalty is constitutional then every time it is 
imposed it will affect the rights of parties with vested property 
rights. The mere fact that Bennion has a vested property right 
does not mean that he cannot be made subject to a nonconsent 
penalty. Bennion has not made any showing or claimed that his 
vested property rights are different from any other unleased 
mineral interest owner's property rights. If a nonconsent 
penalty can be constitutionally imposed, then it can be 
constitutionally imposed upon Bennion in this case. 
Bennionfs claim that the 175% nonconsent penalty is 
unconstitutional because it is unreasonable is really a claim 
that there was no risk in drilling the Miles Well. In making 
this assertion, Bennion mischaracterized a case and omitted any 
reference to evidence that supports the Board's decision. 
The amount of the risk involved in drilling the Miles 
Well is a question of fact. The Board made a finding of fact as 
to the amount of risk that was involved in drilling the Miles 
Well. The Board found "there is sufficient evidence of risk 
incurred by the consenting owner that a penalty of 175% is 
appropriate" (Order at 10). As stated in Section E of the 
Arguments of this brief, if there is substantial evidence to 
support this finding of fact, then a reviewing court may not find 
to the contrary. This finding of fact that there was enough risk 
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to impose a 175% nonconsent penalty is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Bennion has failed --. ;^):.t. *o a m 
evi d e n c e in tin i ece - - * - , ena ! t y 
is unreasonable except that i ^ M S . K - iiiiiing ,-i irv h. ie is 
low and that there : * •:* uneconomic well OT **- Drilling 
Ur li t. Davi d I1" 1 I »ai i - . . - . -
involved ii 1 drillinc : ,<.- Miles Well. •*•••• included t . * ne i isk 
of price fluctuations (TR, page IV;, (2) the possibility of a 
blowout (TR page 3 0 ) ; (3) mecham'nal problems may develop, such 
as casing failure (TR page 30) three other companies had 
elected not to p a rticipate in ' tne clriiiii: of tl :ie 1^  li ] es We] ] ( TR 
page 22); (5) the risk that, the Mi les Well could turn out to be 
uneconomic (TR, page 2r) >- (6) drill! ng a well to 1 4,000 feet 
There is r 10 evidence i n the record to contradict this 
testimony. Bennion put oii ilo evidence to refute c contradict 
this testimon • ~ ,. r 
brief arguing that the risk ui drilling ?\ dry hole is v e \ s; 
The risk < -,*.-; :.t: ^ t c ! P I - o^ I y f * J - * : sk i * ) - * 
COI if rOI ltS ;: :J I c r (--«, 
not productive ot i and/or gas whic^ :s ioi productive -f 
oil and/or c:a^ in paying quantities) " MANUAL OF Oil AND GAS 
TERMS,, IA ....... r.-. „ MEYERS, Sixt .h Edition (1984) at 255 
Even if the r isk of dri lling a di: y hoi e I s small, the risk of 
dri 1 1 1 i ig ai ,. l ineconomi c we] 3 i s s t::ii ] ] si gi ii f i c a n t , S i in, i 1 ai 1 y the 
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fact that there is not an uneconomic well on the Drilling Unit is 
also only one factor in deciding the risk of drilling the Miles 
Well. The fact that the Tew Well is an economical well does not 
guarantee that the Miles Well will be an economical well. 
Mr. Laramie testified that the cost of a well in the 
Altamont/Bluebell Field was in the neighborhood of $1.75 to 2 
million (TR, page 15). A well that is not a dry hole may produce 
insufficient oil and gas to pay for itself. If a well costs $2 
million, but only produces $1 million worth of oil, it is clearly 
not a dry hole but on the other hand, it is certainly not an 
economic well. 
Any investment to drill a well is risky. The well may 
not produce as much as expected, the price of oil may drop, the 
well may blow out and many other unforeseen events may occur. 
The parties investing in the well are agreeing to pay for the 
cost of drilling the well, regardless of the success of the well. 
These parties do not have any guarantee that they will ever 
recover their money and have taken a large risk in drilling the 
Miles Well. 
Bennion has not assumed any portion of this risk. 
Bennion is not liable for any of the costs of the well out of his 
pocket. The costs of drilling attributable to his share will not 
be paid by Bennion, but will be paid by the consenting parties. 
If the Miles Well is successful, then the consenting parties will 
be able to recover these costs out of production. If the Miles 
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Well produces less than enough oil to pay for itself, Bennion 
would receive substantial royalties whi J e the consenting parties 
would have lost money. 
T h e r e i s c-nl is t m i l m l i b i d e m <j h i i i i ] i p n i t t h< B u r i n f " 1 
f i n d i n g t h a t a 1 75% n o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y i s r e a s o n a b l e i n t h i s 
c a s e . The n o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y h a s been a p p l i e d _.. a 
c o i i s t i t: i i I: I c:> i I a II £ a s 1 I I o n . 
Before leaving this section, ANR must note that 
Bennion fs characterization of the case of Windsor Gas Corp. v. 
Railroad Commission of Texas, 529 S• W 2d • • * (Tex, Ci v, App. 
1975) is misleading and contains incorrect statements s^ Texas 
Railroad CommIssIoi I i:egu 1 a 1:es 1:1 ie oi 1 ai Ic:3 * f • s 
The Texas Railroad Commission is authorized under the Texas 
Mineral Interest Pooling Ae1 :, Tex. Nat. Res Code Ann §§102,001 
et seq. (Vernoi 1 978) In fun t" pniiJ ret tain i ntei cvst s i I a ' ' if a. i r 
and reasonable offer to voluntarily pool" is made before the 
force pooling application is made. liI Windsor •*- -ffer made by 
Windsor to voluntary pool included a proposal * . eiaht 
wells on a take it or leave i t basis, Wilson, the party Windsor 
was attempting to for ce poo] , could either agree to pay for all • 
eight (8) wells or be s u b j e c +n a 9 +-o \•) nonconsent 
penalty on al1 eight (8) wells. The Texas Railroad Commission 
di smissed W:i i id sot 's a) \\\ I i < w t inn* f m fori f pnol inc.) "'iiiiri mi Liir 
and reasonable offer to voluntarily pool was not made to Wilson. 
The Court affirmed the Texas Railroad's refusal to enter a force 
pooling order. It did not invalidate a force pooling order as 
stated in Bennion's Brief (Bennion's Brief at 17). Nor did the 
Court of Appeals state that any part of its decision rested upon 
the fact that the operators were not taking any risks in drilling 
the wells as stated in Bennion's Brief (Bennion's Brief at page 
17). The Court of Civil Appeals did recite testimony that 
drilling in the area had an 84.6% percent success rate. This 
implies that more than one out of eight wells were not successful 
which is certainly not risk free. Finally, the Court of Civil 
Appeals did not hold that a Forced Pooling Order with a 2 to 1 
risk factor was not fair and reasonable as stated in Bennion's 
Brief (Bennion's Brief at page 17). The court actually held 
"that appellant's offer for the initial drilling of eight 
drilling units on a 'take it all' or 'leave it all' basis, and 
with a two-to-one risk factor, was not a 'fair and reasonable 
offer to voluntarily pool'" (Windsor at 837). 
C. THE BOARD WAS CORRECT IN MODIFYING THE ORIGINAL 
POOLING ORDER. 
1. Board Has The Authority Under The Act To Amend 
Pooling Orders. 
The administrative mandate given to the Board by the 
Utah Legislature ranges from the very broad (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-5(1), "The board has jurisdiction over all persons and 
property necessary to enforce this chapter" and Utah Code Ann. § 
40-6-5(3) (a), "The board has the authority to regulate: (a) all 
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operations tor and related to Ihp prnd ") 
to the very specific (Utah Code Ann, § 40-6-6(5), r v board may 
enter an order pooling .- . ; interests in 1 he drilling unit for the 
development: and oper a 5 . ties t 101 lal» 1 y , '' t ri1 > " ••; l> PI ' nd 
Pooling Statute authorizes the Board to pool involuntarily the 
unleased mineral interest ' Bennion with the worki: interests 
of tl ie other o\ im ! 1 1 i :ig i u li !::. 
The following examples in the Act demonstrate that the 
need to modify orders is an integral part of the EK 
responsibility in ca: rying oilr its mandate to conserve and 
regulate the production : nl nnd gay :* r^ sr.atu __ jiah.Uta! I 
Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), p.« \ M*-
(2) The Board may modify the order ' > 
provide an exception to the authorized 
location of a well when the board finds such 
a modification to be reasonably necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling 
units for a pool shall cover a] 1 lands 
determined by the board to be underlaid by 
the pool, and the order may he modified by 
the Board to> include additional areas 
determined to be underlaid by the pool. 
(4) The Board may modify the 
order to decrease or increase the size of 
drilling units or permit additional wells : i 
be drilled within the established units. 
(Emphasis adde :I ) 
Between the time of the original 1981 Order dated April 
30, 1981, and the hearing in this matter on May 24, 1990,,,, the Ac f 
had been amended IJ.9J M) .irnJl the Board had issued the 1985 Order 
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affecting this and other lands in the Altamont/Bluebell Field 
allowing for two producing wells in each drilling unit. In order 
to enforce the mandatory nonconsent penalty contained in the Act, 
the Board had to modify the 1981 Order. Clearly, the Board had 
the authority to amend the 1981 Order. 
Just as the Board has the legislative authority to 
formulate a compulsory pooling order, the Board must also have 
the authority to amend or otherwise modify its forced pooling 
orders. To decide to the contrary would force the Board into the 
untenable position of having to decide once and for all time all 
matters that could affect the pooled unit, even when 
circumstances could change dramatically. In this case, the 
circumstances and conditions under which the 1981 Order was 
entered have changed. The statute has changed to allow the Board 
to authorize more than one well on a spacing unit. The Board may 
also increase or decrease the size of a spacing unit. The body 
of geologic and production knowledge in the Altamont/Bluebell 
Field has expanded. We now know that one well will not drain the 
640-acre drilling unit established under the existing pooling 
order, and the Board has expressly so found. 1985 Order at 5. 
The 1985 Order has now authorized the drilling of a second 
production well in a drilling unit. Id. at 8. Certainly, these 
changes are significant. ANR cannot imagine how changes of the 
nature contemplated by the general rule could be more significant 
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than those i i i this matter or be nioi e worthy of meriting an 
amendment of the existing order. 
Although the Utah courts have not ruled on the issue, 
other oil and gas producing state courts have resoundingly 
endorsed the an itf lor i t::j o f ai i aclfi ti i :i i sti: at:! ve agei icy char ged wi th 
the regulation of the oil ai id gas industry to change or modify 
its orders. Railroad Commission v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 
S.W.2d 599 (Tex . 19(M! ) -it (A)/: 
the Commission's power to regulate oil 
and gas production in the interest of 
conservation and protection of correlative 
rights is a continuing one and its orders are 
subject to change or modification where 
conditions have changed materially, new and 
unforseen problems arise or mistakes are 
discovered. 
See also, Vierson v. Bennett, 353 P.2d ^ 1 1 ^ i fJKJ -=* \ ;-„„ ,, 
Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum to r2 
(1951); see generally, 6 H. WTLi-IAM^ hAL ^EYERS, AM GAS 
LAW, § 947 (1989); i > KRAMER AND * MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING 
AND UN ITIZ AT 10!1 I, et set], . i i 11" 11 i I 
In analyzing Bennion's arguments in support of his 
claim that the Board cannot amend an or der because he has a 
vested i ICJM i t u> 1 i 1 i im| H i i i 1 i»ecomes clear that Bennion 
has confused the issue of a vested property right and the 
obligation to pay his share *M the dri 1 li ng cost. In i n< 
the • • : - u : . Board has i IO t divested Bennion of 
any property rights 3ennion still owns his mineral interest and 
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has the right to receive his just share of production. The only 
thing that has changed is the pooling order now contains a 
provision on how Bennion's share of the cost of drilling the 
Miles Well is to be paid. 
It should be remembered that the Original Pooling Order 
did not address the drilling of future wells. It did not, as 
required by statute, provide for a nonconsent penalty if a party 
elected not to participate in a future well. The Board just did 
not foresee in 1981 that an additional well would be drilled. 
Bennion's reliance upon the Oklahoma cases holding a 
pooling order pools the entire unit and not the wellbore is 
misplaced. The Utah Forced Pooling Statutes and the Oklahoma 
Forced Pooling Statutes are completely different. In Oklahoma, a 
party can lose the right to participate in the entire unit for 
all time if he does not participate and pay his share of the 
costs of the first well on the unit. 
The Pooling Order in Inexco Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. 
Commission, 767 P.2d 404 (Ok. 1988) required: 
the owners to either participate by 
paying their share of the costs of drilling 
and completing the well or elect to accept a 
bonus. The owners could accept a cash bonus 
of $1,250 per acre plus an overriding or 
excess royalty of 1/16 of 8/8, or a non-cash 
bonus of an overriding or excess royalty of 
1/8 of 8/8. Id. at 405. 
In Amoco Production v. Corp. Commission of Oklahoma 751 P.2d 203 
(Ok. App. 1986) ("Amoco I") the nonconsenting owner was required 
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to f armout its interest and retail •:; ; 6/ 8ths excess 
r o y a 1 f y , w t i« M i •' i i' i i t JI J \' ( i I n • ,
 : ,=> i n the ini • .. ,•: i 
well. Id, at 205. 
This was also the case :• -nioco p r o (j u c^ : :[ o n v> cor p. 
Commission of Oklahoma, ^ . . (W* a ^ I Q D T X ("Amoco 
I I " ) . The pooling order provided: 
for ai I election by the owners of 
interests i n the drilling and spacing unit. 
The owners could either elect to participate 
in the working interests in the unit well, or 
elect 1. accept a cash bonus plus an override 
in lie,; (f ^^ticipation Id at 836. 
This election .: keepinc ^ working interest and paying the cost 
of drilling i: ki i Ig i i i11 .11 i eceiving on 1 y 
an overriding royalty interest was also described in Helmerich & 
Payne, Inc. v. Corp. Commission of Oklahoma, 532 P,2d 419 (Ok. 
1975). TI i e p o o 1 i i i g o i d e i: p i o v i d e d: 
that the sum of $30.00 per acre or no 
cash bonus but an override of 1/16 of 7/8 on 
oil and 1/8 of 7/8 on gas is hereby fixed as 
a fair and reasonable bonus to be paid any 
party whose interest is pooled herein in lieu 
of his right to participate in the working 
interest of any and all unit wells in which 
he has an interest. 
Id. at 420. 
and that 
In the event any owner of an outstanding 
leasehold estate does not desire to 
participate in the development of the nine-
section area, he shall be awarded a bonus, 
either in cash or in overriding royalty, as 
set out above, in lieu thereof; and he shall 
be required to elect within 1 5 days fr om the 
-27-
date of this Order whether he desires to 
accept the bonus herein established for all 
his interests in any and all of the nine 
drilling and spacing units, and the type of 
bonus he elects to receive, or whether he 
desires to participate in the development 
program under one of the alternatives set out 
above. 
Id. at 420-21. 
The issue in each of these cases (except Helmerich & 
Payne) was whether the election of converting one's interest from 
a working interest to a royalty interest applied only to the 
first well or the entire unit. Each court which faced the issue 
held that the order provided that the election was on a unit-wide 
basis and by electing not to participate in the initial well, 
then nonconsenting party, in essence, conveyed their working 
interest in the unit and reserved a royalty interest in the unit. 
The Utah Forced Pooling Statute is dramatically 
different from the Oklahoma forced pooling statute. In Utah when 
an unleased mineral interest owner, such as Bennion, elects not 
to participate in the drilling of a well, then he will be paid a 
royalty until the consenting parties recover the nonconsent 
penalty. At that point, he is entitled to participate in the 
well and the drilling unit as a working interest owner. 
In this case, the Tew Well paid out in May, 1976, prior 
to Bennion?s interest in the Tew Well being force pooled. 
Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil. Gas and Mining. 675 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1983). Bennion has participated in the Tew Well and the 
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Drilling Unit as an unleased mineral interest owner when the 
Miles W e J 1 \ i a s p i o p c .* ? s t / d B fj 1111 J i > 11 » m i J < I f i n n / e t * 11 M led to p a r t i c i p a t e 
as an unleased mineral interest owner. He did not elect to do 
so. TR, pages 1 4-1 f* 
1 me • , lurt is whether 
Bennion is requirec * t r, subject t ,.• zionconsent penalty since 
he elected rr *• +^ rv j -s snare oi diini 
issue < %rl ie ^ owns an unleased mineral u teiest in 
the unit. T i . ;:. :ispute. 
The Forced ' St-'itir* e, mandates that «i pooling 
order provide fnr a nonconsent penalty. "The order shall provide 
that each consenting owner shall be entitled to receive . . . Ilis 
proportionate p*nr 1 nil tin i mi nnseiit imj nwni'i "  i "-thiii if such 
production until costs are recovered as provided 
subsection", , t*h Code Ann. ^  40-6-6 \
 K±9Bo), u uusts 
include the • - >•;.-•:.. • • extent tha; the 1QP1 
Order does not include a nonconsent penalty then < 
violation of this provision. 
The oi lly i ssi ie that tine Oklahoma cases raise is whether 
the nonconsent penalty should be recovered from the production 
from the unit .. * whether it should be recovered fion1 pi od^i: t icin 
- : • • : i wel 1 f basis. The Order provides that it Is to be 
recovered .:>• - •/ wel J basis. The Forced Pooling Statute 
itself is not as •. N • a;=. II ret ei cnees i ecuvering 
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costs out of "the well" and "the unit." See Utah Code Ann. § 
40-6-6(6). 
ANR believes that by applying the nonconsent penalty to 
each well separately, then the rights of the nonconsenting owner 
in the first well will be protected. By determining that the 
costs of drilling the second well can only be collected from 
production from the second well, then the nonconsenting owner 
will continue to receive revenues from the first well. If it 
were unit wide, Bennion would cease to recover revenues from the 
Tew Well until the Miles Well paid out. 
This Court had the chance to interpret a prior version 
of this statute in a different fact situation in Bennion v. Gulf 
Oil Corp,, 716 P.2d 267 (Utah 1985). That case involved a second 
well but arose prior to the 1985 Order which allowed two wells to 
be produced at one time. Gulf drilled the first well on the unit 
that had been forced pooled. Bennion owned an unleased mineral 
interest in the unit. Gulf drilled a second well, shut-in the 
first well and attempted to charge Bennion, as a nonconsenting 
mineral interest owner, his share of the cost of drilling the 
second well. This Court held that a nonconsenting owner's rights 
in the first well should not be trampled by the drilling of a 
second well. 
That decision is not applicable in this case, since the 
Board has been given the authority to allow a second well to be 
drilled. The Board's discretion in allowing the costs to be 
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recovered on; ( * ~ , 
is supported by the reasoning of that case in protecting the 
rights of the owners in thp first well. It the Court orders that 
the i 101 iconsei 1 t penally' " «u mi , i M « dppiii'ti o ' ide basis, 
the:.n Bennion wi 1 1 receive decreased revenues from the Tew We J J 
until the Miles Well pays out. 
2. Bennion Has Waived His Claim That A Pooling Order 
Cannot Be Amended. 
Bennion has waived his cla 
Order may not be modi* led --v : a new nonconsent penalty cannot be 
imposed by claiming rights under the Forced Pooling Statute that 
are not included ii 8 1 OMfei . 
The 1977 version of the Forced Pooling Statute 
provided: 
a nonconsenting owner of a tract in a 
drilling unit, which is not subject to any 
lease or other contract for the development 
thereof for oil and gas, shall be deemed to 
have a basic landowners1 royalty of 1/8, or 
12-1/2%, :>i the production allocated to such 
tract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 4';-.' < • .197 \i (emphasis added]. 
The 1983 versi • mi'd I'oni imj Stdtule requires 
that a forced pooling order provide that: 
.,?! nonconsenting owner of a tract in a 
drilling unit, which is not subject to a 
lease or other contract for the development 
of oil and gas, shall receive as a royalty 
the average landowners royalty attributable 
to each tract within the dn'ib'ng unat, 
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determined prior to the commencement of 
drilling and payable from the production 
allocated to each tract until the consenting 
owners have recovered the costs as provided 
in Subsection (6)." 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(7)(b) (1988) [emphasis added]. 
Since the Tew Well had been drilled and had paid out 
when the Forced Pooling Order was entered in 1981, the 1981 Order 
did not include a provision for the payment of royalties in the 
future. The only reference to royalty was a calculation of 
"Royalty Interest Accumulations" which were stated to be "Based 
on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately reduced, until 
payout. Upon payout this royalty merges with and is included in 
the working interest." (1981 Order at 5). The 1981 Order also 
provides that Shell shall pay Bennion interest on "Bennionfs 
statutory royalty." (1981 Order at 7). There is no provision in 
the 1981 Order to pay royalties in the future. 
Even though the 1981 Order did not specifically provide 
for royalty payments in the future and stated that the royalty 
merged with the working interest when pay out occurred in 1976, 
Bennion demanded and claimed that he is entitled by statute to a 
royalty. In the hearing in May, 1990, the following statements 
were made: 
MR. LARAMIE: Yes. If Mr. Bennion would have agreed to 
participate in the well based on actual costs, he would 
have had to pay about $60,000. Under the statute, he 
will still be paid a royalty interest based on the 
average royalty in the field. He will not receive 
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nothing until the well is paid out, but he 
will have received a royalty rate based on an 
average of the royalty paid in the field. 
• MR. McINTYRE: Is there any way you car - -. ve me a 
figure on that? 
MR. LARAMIE: Yes, it would be about 13,89 percent 
MR. STIRBA: But, remember, just so it's clear, that's 
statutorily mandated, and that's only one-eighth, or in 
this case, what—a percentage of his share that he's 
otherwise entitled to. (TR a* page 62). 
Mr. Stirba, who • .* representi.^n Bennion at thf 
hearing, was assert:' UiaL ben 
royalty based upon t:.u statute and not tht- 1961 Order. lf :- lot 
clear whether he was. claiming h - royalty l -^  r yal^v. 
In either case, he we < r> -r • 
was not included in the 19 81 Order. 
Ii I e s s e n c e , what B e n n i o n is c l a i m i n g ii i hi s appeal .is 
that ANR is nol enl it Ird hi i eue L \/t» <i u o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y tor 
financing the Miles Well which is "statutorily mandated11 since 
the 1981 Order did not contai- specific provision providing h'M' 
fut1 •' . • pena l t w < >T the other hand, Bennion is 
claiming a royalty even though thee 198J niidf»i does not contain a 
provision for it* payment of royalty, Reunion i unking Mus 
; *- -n^--« provision ol the 1981 Order or a future 
amendment ** * -:-J - ier, but because i t is contained in the 
Forced Pooling Statute. 
Bennion has in essence, admitted that the 1981 Order 
should be and can be amended to include the payment of royalties 
: *-
until payout based upon the statute. At the same time he is 
claiming that: the 1981 Order cannot be amended to provide for a 
nonconsent penalty since it does not benefit him. He cannot have 
it both ways; by his actions, Bennion has waived his claim that 
the 1981 Order cannot be amended. 
3. The Boards Order Is Consistent With The 
Declaration Of Public Interest. 
The Board's Order protects the correlative rights of 
all owners and is consistent with the Declaration of Public 
Interest. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 provides: 
It is declared.to be in the public 
interest to foster, encourage, and promote 
the development, production and utilization 
of natural resources of oil and gas in the 
state of Utah in such a manner as will 
prevent waste; to authorize and to provide 
for the operation and development of oil and 
gas properties in such a manner that a 
greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may 
be obtained and that the correlative rights 
of all owners may be fully protected. 
As discussed previously, the legislature specified in 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 how the correlative rights of both the 
consenting and nonconsenting parties are to be protected when a 
well is drilled. The legislature concluded that if a party would 
not agree to pay its share of the cost of drilling a well, then 
the consenting party should be compensated for the additional 
risk. The legislature mandated that the nonconsenting party, in 
return for having a well drilled on its behalf by the consenting 
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owners, shall be subject to a nonconsent penalty of iou 
Bennionfs argument is essentially that the application 
of the provisions of the statute implement i M , " " .« I '(.M, 1 ai at i 01 .1 
Put ) 1 1c 11 I te:i : est u i o 1 a tes 111c declaration u 1 Public Interest, 
Bennionf s and ANRf s correlative rights are being protected as 
required by statute. A well has hoon ii» i ! loci «;":il m > i isk l.< 
Bennion. Bern lion is receiving 1: lis share ^i jevenues fron the Tew 
Well without deduction for the costs cf *»'«=- vil^? w^I 3ennion 
is receiving royalties * • c ' ->e 
liable for any of the cubts ui oiiiling the Miles He , except out 
of production. ANR ._• other consenting owners have invested 
substantial *- recover those 
investments and are entitled by statute to a nonconsent penalty. 
The Declaration of Public Interest i c - ^ n ^ 
piotectic. - iust Bennion. TN- protection rf 
correlative rights ;: accordance with the provisions o+ t-. 
Forced Pooling Statute does not viol at P thp- n* - - , ic 
JSt. 
D. THE 1985 ORDER DOES NOT REQUIRE NOR ALLOW ANR TO 
PETITION THE BOARD FOR THE RIGHT TO DRILL THE MILES WELL. 
The 1985 Order does net require any evidence ol 
economic feasibility tu t<e pirs- ti-- k jes not 
i: eqi lire the Board to make a determinationi truat 1 he second well be 
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economically feasible prior to its drilling. Sections C and D of 
the 1985 Order provide: 
C. Additional wells may be drilled at 
the option of the operator of the unit, based 
upon geologic and engineering data for that 
unit which will justify the drilling of an 
additional well in order to recover 
additional oil, provided the additional well 
appears to be economically feasible. 
D. Economically feasible means that a 
prudent operator would have a reasonable 
opportunity to recover the costs of drilling, 
completing, producing and operating the well, 
plus a reasonable profit. 
[Emphasis added.] 
There is no requirement that evidence of economic 
feasibility be presented to the Board. There is no requirement 
that the Board make a determination of economic feasibility prior 
to the drilling a second well. In fact, there is nothing in the 
Order to base Bennion?s argument upon. Bennion, in fact, had to 
fabricate out of thin air an alleged quotation to begin his 
argument. 
Bennion1s brief at page 34 contains the following 
quotation: "An additional well could be drilled at the option of 
the operator provided the well appears to be economically 
feasible." [emphasis omitted]. This sentence does not appear in 
the 1985 Order, nor does it appear in the Order entered by the 
Board in Docket No. 90-021, Cause No. 139-63 which is being 
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appealed by Bennion. Fabricated statements cannot be the basis 
of an appeal. 
A reading of what the 1985 Order actually states shows 
that "Additional wells may be drilled at the option of the 
operator of the unit" (Section C, 1985 Order) [emphasis added] 
and not the determination of the Board. 
The requirement that the Board review the economic 
feasibility of every second well would be a major departure from 
the Board's prior practice. The economic feasibility of first 
wells are not reviewed by the Board. The economic feasibility of 
replacement wells are not reviewed by the Board. If the Board 
had intended to require operators to appear before the Board and 
convince the Board that a second well was economically feasible 
before it could be drilled, it would have clearly stated such 
requirement. 
In fact, if the Board had intended to make such a 
requirement it would have enforced its own order. The Court can 
take judicial notice of the fact that numerous second wells have 
been drilled under the 1985 Order and the board has not required 
any operator to supply evidence of economic feasibility. In this 
case, the Board knew that the Miles Well was spudded prior to the 
hearing (See Order Finding of Facts 8 and 9), yet did not require 
ANR to cease operations or furnish evidence of economic 
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feasibility. The Operator is to determine if he desires to drill 
an additional well. 
ANR respectfully requests this Court to take judicial 
notice of the transcript in Docket No. 85-007, Cause No. 139-42 
in which the Board entered the 1985 Order. A review of the 
transcript from Docket No. 85-007, Cause No. 139-42, shows that 
the intent of Sections C and D of the 1985 Order was to protect 
the Operator from being forced to drill uneconomic wells while 
preventing the Operator from escaping its duty under the implied 
covenant to develop contained in typical oil and gas leases. The 
application to drill additional wells was intended to encourage 
but not require additional drilling (1985 TR, page 14). Frank 
Douglas, the attorney for ANR and the other petitioners in the 
1985 hearing, argued that the operator should be left with the 
decision to drill a second well and not the Board or another 
party (1985 TR, pages 21-23, 34-36). ANR presented testimony 
that the parties that can make the best decision to drill or not 
to drill a seicond well are the operator and the parties who 
invest money in the well. (1985 TR, pages 126, 162-163, 185) 
The Board's staff expressed concern about leaving the decision to 
drill a second well solely with the Operator, but supported the 
proposed order if it contained language which would make clear 
that the order would define economic feasibility and not modify 
the traditional lessor/lessee relationship (1985 TR, pages 21, 
237). 
-38-
Bow Valley Petroleum, Koch Exploration Company, Sonat 
Exploration Company and Phillips Petroleum also expressed 
concerns that the Operator should make the decision to drill a 
second well (1985 TR, pages 38-39, 217-18, 238-43). 
In closing arguments Mr. Pruitt, attorney for ANR and 
the other petitioners, stated: 
The petition is to allow additional 
wells without the necessity of coming before 
the Board on an individual well by well basis 
to drill each additional well. That's never 
been desirable, and we want to keep that 
foremost in your mind as you consider this 
matter. The concern that has been expressed 
by numerous parties, operators, and 
nonoperators and royalty owners alike seems 
to focus really on the nonexercise of the 
option, or perhaps a way in which to force an 
operator to drill a certain well out of order 
or to drill a well of questionable merit 
(1985 TR, page 251). 
To implement this, ANR and the other petitioners 
offered to amend their proposed order. Mr. Pruitt read some of 
these provisions which included: 
"(C) Additional wells may be drilled at 
the option of the operator of the unit based 
upon geologic and engineering data for that 
unit which will justify the drilling of an 
additional well in order to recover 
additional oil, provided the additional well 
appears to be economically and geologically 
feasible in the judgment of the operator. 
"(D) Economically feasible means that 
the operator has a reasonable opportunity to 
recover the costs of drilling, completing, 
producing, and operating the well, plus a 
reasonable profit." 
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(1985 TR, at pages 254-55) [emphasis in original]. 
The final 1985 Order changed the proposed phrase 
"provided the additional well appears to be economically and 
geologically feasible in the judgment of the operator" to 
"provided the additional well appears to be economically 
feasible." 
A discussion on this change occurred between Hugh 
Garner, attorney for Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation, and Chairman 
Williams, as follows: 
MR. GARNER: It strikes me that we should, instead 
of basing it solely,on the economic, we should 
bring into it both the geologic and the 
engineering aspect. 
CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: Which paragraph are you referring 
to? 
MR. GARNER: I'm looking at paragraph (c) on page 
7. The language has been limited by saying, 
"appears to be economically feasible." 
CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: Our reason for that change is 
because we did not want to get into the business 
of singling out components of an economic 
determination. 
It seems to me that there are several components, 
and we wanted to leave those as they are without 
appearing to be selecting from among them. So we 
thought that we were making it broader, leaving it 
an open--a true economic determination based on 
all factors, including geologic factors. 
MR. GARNER: Are we still looking at this in terms 
of the judgment of the operators? I see that 
language has been struck also. 
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CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: We tried to incorporate what 
we think is the existing condition now, which is a 
prudent operator standard. 
I think it is in the judgment of the operator, but his 
judgment has to be sound and not arbitrary. That was 
what we were doing with paragraph (d). We changed the 
concept. We stated it in a different fashion. (1985 
TR, page 258) [emphasis added]. 
The Board intended that the determination to drill a 
second well be the same as it was for the first well i.e. the 
prudent operator test. The prudent operator standard is the test 
for determining if an operator or lessee has breached an implied 
covenant such as the implied covenant of reasonable development. 
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, Sixth Edition 
(1984). 
If an operator wants to drill a well he decides if it 
will be economic. The Operator does not need to obtain a 
determination from the Board that the well is economic. On the 
other hand, if an operator refuses to drill a well and a lessor 
can show that the operator is in breach of its implied covenant 
to develop, then the 1985 Order does not protect the operator for 
its failure to drill. 
E. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT BECAUSE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THOSE FINDINGS. 
1. The Standard for Review is "Substantial Evidence. 
This Court recently established standards to be 
utilized in the review of findings of fact and conclusions of law 
by the an administrative agency. In First National Bank of 
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Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 
P.2D 1163 (1990), the Court stated that the Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), requires 
the 
. . . appellate court to review the 
"whole record" to determine whether the 
agency's action is "supported by substantial 
evidence." "Substantial evidence" is that 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that 
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion. See Consolo v. FMC, 
383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16 
L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Idaho State Ins. Fund v. 
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 
930-31 (1985); Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
An appellate court applying the "substantial 
evidence test" must consider both the 
evidence that supports the Tax Commission's 
factual findings and the evidence that 
detracts from the findings. Nevertheless, 
the party challenging the findings — in this 
case, the taxpayer—must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show 
that despite the supporting facts, the Tax 
Commission's findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 [certain citations in footnotes included]. 
Assuming that the Act is constitutional and that the 
Board had the authority to amend its orders, the case before the 
Court becomes a review of factual determinations made by the 
Board which led to the legal conclusion that an imposition of a 
175% nonconsent penalty is fair to all parties, and that such a 
finding is consistent with the purposes of the Act. 
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2. The Review of Evidence is not a Trial de Novo. In 
reviewing the findings of the Board, the Court should not 
substitute its own conclusions it might have reached had it been 
the original trier of fact. In Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), the court said: 
In undertaking such a review, this court 
will not substitute its judgment as between 
two reasonably conflicting views, even though 
we may have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before us for de novo 
review, [Citations omitted]. It is the 
province of the Board, not appellate courts, 
to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw 
the inferences. 
776 P.2d 63, 68. 
F. THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD'S 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS. 
1. The Board's Expertise is Needed to Make the 
Findings in this Case. 
In First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, supra, the Court recognized 
that the expertise of the administrative agencies must be 
considered by the appellate court. The expertise, however, must 
be applied in a manner consistent with the agency's legislative 
mandate. 
Although it is a "universally recognized 
rule" that this court must "take some 
cognizance of the expertise of the agency in 
its particular field and accordingly to give 
some deference to its determination," Utah 
Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590 
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P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979), the agency's 
decision must rest upon some sound 
evidentiary basis, not a creation of fiat. 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 
(Utah 1988); Utah Power & Light. 590 P.2d at 335; 799 P.2d 1163, 
1166 [footnotes included]. 
The Utah State Legislature has empowered the Board 
under the Forced Pooling Statute to establish drilling units and 
to set, when appropriate, levels of nonconsent penalties. In 
reaching its findings, the Board heard extensive testimony, 
examined exhibits submitted by the parties, and heard arguments 
of counsel from both parties. Based on these factors, the Board 
made factual findings and conclusions of law, which rested on a 
"sound evidentiary basis." See also Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 
601 (Utah 1983), where this Court said: 
In reviewing decisions such as these, a 
court should afford great deference to the 
technical expertise or more extensive 
experience of the responsible agency. 
658 P.2d 601, 610. 
Because of the experience of the Board and its 
understanding of the complexities of drilling and pooling orders, 
we would urge this Court to give deference to the Board's 
findings which have been amply supported by the record. The 
members of the Board come from a cross section of interests and 
backgrounds. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) provides: 
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2. The board shall then consist of 
seven members appointed by the governor, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate• No 
more than four members shall be from the same 
political party. The members shall have the 
following qualifications: 
(a) two members knowledgeable 
in mining matters; 
(b) two members knowledgeable 
in oil and gas matters; 
(c) one member knowledgeable 
in ecological and environmental 
matters; 
(d) one member who is a 
private land owner, owns a mineral 
or royalty interest and is 
knowledgeable in those interests; 
and 
(e) one member who is 
knowledgeable in geological 
matters. 
Each of these individuals has been chosen to give the 
Board the necessary breadth of experience to review natural 
resource matters. 
2. The Board f s Legal Conclusion was Supported by the 
Record as a Whole. 
In the case of Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, supra, the Court explained 
that factual questions sometimes lead to determinations of 
"special law", which, by their very nature, require the expertise 
of the agency empowered by the legislature to make such 
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decisions. The Court in reviewing such findings of special laws, 
held that considerable weight should be given to such findings. 
Also among these intermediate issues are 
the Commission's decisions on what can be 
called questions of "special law." These are 
the Commission's interpretations of the 
operative provisions of the statutory law it 
is empowered to administer, especially those 
generalized terms that bespeak a legislative 
intent to delegate their interpretation to 
the responsible agency. In reviewing agency 
decisions of this type, we apply what we have 
called the "time honored rule of law . . . 
that the construction of statutes by 
governmental agencies charged with their 
administration should be given considerable 
weight . . . ." 
658 P.2d 601, at page 610 (citing McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); West Jordan v. 
Department of Employment Security, 656 P.2d 411 (Utah 1982). 
Because of the extensive record in this matter, there 
was sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and the 
conclusions of law contained in the Order of the Board, and the 
Court should give "considerable weight" to the Board's 
interpretation of the Forced Pooling Statute. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The issues which have been raised in this appeal have 
involved significant constitutional matters. Bennion's brief has 
largely failed to demonstrate through the citation of applicable 
case law any constitutional basis for attacking the Forced 
Pooling Statute. Nor has he marshalled the evidence from the 
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record to support his contentions that the board acted 
inappropriately in making its Order. 
The Forced Pooling Statute is constitutional. It is a 
fair and reasonable application of the state's police power. It 
has also been implemented in this case in a fair and reasonable 
way by the Board. The Board's Order enforcing the mandatory 
provisions of the Forced Pooling Statute should be upheld. We 
urge the Court to deny Bennion's appeal. 
DATED February 21, 1991. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
John P. Harrington 
Alan A. Enke 
Attorneys for ANR Production 
Company 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION 
OF ANR PRODUCTION COMPANY 
FOR AN ORDER SPECIFYING 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY S.H. 
BENNION AS A NON-CONSENTING 
OWNER UNDER FORCED POOLING 
ORDER COVERING SECTION 1, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 
5W-USM, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
DOCKET NO. 90-021 
CAUSE NO. 139-63 
Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of ANR 
Production Company (ANR), this cause was initially heard before 
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural 
Resources, on Thursday, May 24, 1990, at 10:00 a.m. in the 
Boardroom of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North 
Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the hearing of May 24, 1990, arguments of the 
parties were heard.. The following Board members were present at 
the hearing: 
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
Richard B. Larsen 
Judy F. Lever 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as 
well as board member John M. Garr 
The Board was represented by Alan S. Bachman, Esq., 
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah. 
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining 
were made by Dianne Nielson, Director, Oil, Gas and Mining, and 
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas, and John R. 
Baza, Petroleum Engineer. 
ANR was represented by John Harrington, Esq., and David 
M. Laraime, Sr. Landman. Bennion was represented by Peter 
Stirba, Esq, 
The Board took the matter under advisement and 
requested legal counsel from the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah. 
On or about June 26, 1990, the Secretary of the Board 
transmitted to Petitioner, Respondent's counsel and the Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining the list of six issues with respect to 
which the Board wished further legal briefing. On July 25, 1990, 
after receiving leave to file Amicus Curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil 
and Gas Association (RMOGA) filed a Brief and Response to the 
questions presented by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on June 
21, 1990. The parties Briefs have been considered by the Board. 
On August 23, 1990, pursuant to notice, a continuation of the 
original hearing was held in the Boardroom of the Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 
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301, Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board members were 
present: 
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
Richard B. Larsen 
Judy F. Lever 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as 
well as board member John M. Garr. 
The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq., 
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah. 
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining 
were made by Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas. 
Neither the Petitioners nor Respondent were present. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the 
testimony adduced and the exhibits reviewed in all said hearings 
and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and 
purpose of the May 24, 1990 hearing was given to all interested 
parties as required by law and the rules and regulations of the 
Board. ANR put on evidence regarding the cost of drilling to 
date and the estimated costs of drilling to completion of the 
Miles 2-1B5 well. Further, ANR presented testimony and other 
evidence of its position concerning the risk incurred by the 
consenting interest owners in the drilling of the Miles 2-1B5 
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well. S.H. Bennion, through counsel, argued the legal points set 
forth in his written response, but submitted no evidence in 
rebuttal to ANR's evidence concerning risk of drilling on the 
Miles 2-1B5 well. The cause was continued by the Board and 
further argument in the form of briefs to specific questions of 
the Board has been provided by counsel and Amicus Curiae. This 
cause was heard again on August 23, 1990, with due and regular 
notice of the time, place and purpose of the hearing having been 
given to all interested parties as required by law and the rules 
of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
of the Request for Agency Action and over all parties interested 
therein and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the order 
hereinafter set forth. 
3. The Request for Agency Action in this matter is a 
request to modify the order in Cause No. 139-13, specifying the 
percentage of costs to be recovered by all consenting owners of 
the Miles 2-1B5 well, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
USM, Duchesne County, Utah, (hereinafter "Miles 2-1B5 well"). 
The order in Cause No. 139-13 dated April 30, 1981, and effective 
July 26, 1979, force pooled the drilling unit created by the 
order of this Board in Cause No. 139-3. 
Specifically the Request for Agency Action sought 
relief as follows: 
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(a) That the consenting owners of the the Miles 2-1B5 
well be reimbursed for.S.H. Bennion's share, a non-consenting 
mineral interest owner, of the costs out of production from the 
unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's interests; 
(b) That the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5 well 
own and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 2-
1B5 well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations 
payable out of production until the consenting owners have been 
paid the amount due under the terms of the modified order 
relating to the subject drilling unit; 
(c) That each consenting owner of the Miles 2-1B5 well 
be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar 
obligations, the share of the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to its 
interest in the separate drilling units and unless the consenting 
owners agreed otherwise, its proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's 
share of such production until costs are recovered; 
(d) That Bennion be entitled to receive, subject to 
royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production from 
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to S.H. Bennion's interest in the 
subject drilling unit after the consenting interest owners 
recover from S.H. Bennion's share of production the following: 
(i) 100% of the non-consenting owner's share 
of the costs of service equipment beyond the wellhead 
connections, plus 100% ofjtfie non-consenting owner's 
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share of the cost of operation of the well commencing 
with the first production and continuing until the 
consenting owners have recovered these costs; and 
(ii) 200% of that portion of the costs and 
expenses of staking the location, well-site 
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling, 
reworking, deepening, or plugging back, testing, 
completing, and the cost of equipment in the well, 
after deducting any cash contributions received by 
the consenting owner; 
(iii) Interest charged in the amount of the 
prime lending rate as periodically determined by 
Citibank of New York, N.A., plus two percentage points. 
(e) That S.H. Bennion's ownership result in S.H. 
Bennion receiving as a royalty, the average landowner's royalty 
attributable to each tract within the subject drilling unit, 
determined prior to the commencement of drilling, and payable 
from the production allocated to each tract until the consenting 
owners recovered the cost described in paragraphs (d), (i), (ii)/ 
and (iii) set forth above. 
4. The Board's previously entered order in Cause No. 
139-13 force pooled all interests in the subject drilling unit, 
finding, inter alia, that S.H. Bennion was the record owner of an 
unleased, undivided, one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas 
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and minerals located in the northeast quarter, southwest quarter, 
and northwest quarter, southeast quarter, of Section 1, Township 
2 South, Range 5 West, Uinta Special Meridian, Duchesne County, 
Utah. Further, the order held that Shell Oil Company, the 
majority working interest owner and the sole operator of the 
subject drilling unit, was willing to allow S.H. Bennion to share 
in the proceeds of production of that unit from first production 
in the Tew No. 1-1B5 well (hereinafter "Tew 1-1B5") as the 
designated production well capable of producing oil and gas in 
commercial quantities in the subject drilling unit. The order 
made no findings concerning the sharing of costs between 
consenting and non-consenting owners. 
5. This original forced pooling order and S.H. 
Bennion's interest in the pooling unit as set forth in the Cause 
No. 139-13 was determined prior to amendments to the forced 
pooling statute in 1977. Section 40-6-6 (6), Utah Code Ann. 
6. On August 1, 1986, Petitioner ANR succeeded to the 
interest of Shell .Oil Company in the subject drilling unit and 
took over operation of the Tew 1-1B5 effective December 1, 1986. 
7. Effective July 1983, the Utah Legislature repealed 
the then existing Oil and Gas Conservation Act and enacted a new 
statute. On April 12, 1985, this Board as enpowered by the 1983 
Legislature entered its order in Cause No. 139-42 authorizing the 
drilling and simultaneous production,of two wells from each 
-7- 185 
drilling unit in the Greater Altamont-Bluebell-Cedar Rim-Sink 
Area in which Section 1 the subject drilling unit and wells are 
located. 
8. On February 6, 1990, ANR commenced the Miles 2-1B5 
well in Section 1 as the increased density second well in 
Section 1. 
9. On May 24, 1990, arguments of the parties in this 
cause and matter were heard and ANR put on evidence regarding the 
cost of drilling to date, the estimated costs of drilling to 
completion and the basis for its requests for a 200% non-consent 
penalty. S.H. Bennion put on no evidence in rebuttal. 
10o On June 21, 1990, the Board submitted questions to 
the parties for further briefing. 
11« The Board in reviewing its order in Cause No. 
139-13 determines that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances since the entry of that order. The Board finds 
that the change in statutory authority authorizing the drilling 
and simultaneous production of more than one well in the subject 
drilling unit, the geological and economic evidence supporting 
its order in Cause No. 139-42 and the subsequent February 6, 1990 
commencement of the Miles 2-1B5 well as an increased density well 
in the subject drilling unit, constitute changes in circumstances 
sufficient to support modification of its order in Cause No. 
139-13. 
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12. Additionally, the Board in reviewing its order in 
Cause No. 139-13 determines that the order is silent as to the 
rights of consenting and non-consenting interest owners under the 
pooling order concerning reimbursement for costs out of 
production and share of production. The Board therefore finds 
that regulation of operations in this forced pooling unit must be 
modified and supplemented upon terms that are just and 
reasonable. 
13. The Board finds that the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act of 1983, 1983 Utah Laws Chapter 205 provides the applicable 
statutory grounds on which to base its modified order- The Board 
finds that all critical facts before the Board concerning this 
Request for Agency Action occurred after the 1983 legislation was 
enacted. The Board finds the following facts to be critical: 
(a) Increased density production wells were first 
specifically authorized by the Utah Legislature in the 1983 Act. 
(See Utah Code Ann. Section 40-6-6(4) (Supp. 1990).) This 
Board's order dated April 12, 1985, in Cause No. 139-63 
authorized the drilling of second wells for simultaneous 
production because it found that one well per drilling unit was 
not adequately draining the pool; 
(b) The Miles 2-1B5 well was drilled as a second well 
under the Board's increased density order after 1983; and 
1 « 7 
(c) Prior to the above-stated events, this Board's 
order in Cause No. 139-13 would not have required modification 
because no additional wells could have been drilled. 
14. S.H. Bennion has not entered into any prior 
agreement with consenting interest owners which supplants the 
statutory authority and duty of this board to impose costs as 
provided under § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
15. That within the range of 150% to 200% of the 
mandatory non-consent penalty provided under § 40-6-6(6)(b), Utah 
Code Ann. (1953/ as amended), there is sufficient evidence of 
risk incurred by the consenting owner that a penalty of 175% is 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. All interests in the subject drilling unit were 
force pooled by order of this Board as of July 26, 1979. 
2. The Board has the necessary and inherent authority, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 and 40-6-6, (1953 as 
amended) to amend, modify or supplement its previous pooling 
orders where there has been a substantial change in circumstances 
or an omission in a prior order and where failure to modify the 
order would result in the continued enforcement of terms which 
are not just and reasonable or which would fail to protect 
correlative rights. 
4. The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will 
prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and 
protect correlative rights. 
Sufficient evidence now being available upon which to 
reach a decision, the Board issues the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The order previously entered in Cause No. 139-13 is 
amended to provide that the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5 
well shall be reimbursed from S.H. Bennion's share of costs out 
of the production from the unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's 
interests. 
2. Consenting owners from the subject unit shall own 
and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 2-1B5 
well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations payable 
out of production until the consenting owners have been paid the 
amount due under the terms of this order relating to the subject 
drilling unit. 
3. Each consenting interest owner in the unit will be 
entitled to receive, subject to royalty or other similar 
obligations, his or her share of production of the Miles 2-1B5 
well applicable to their interest in the drilling unit and, its 
proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's share or such production 
until costs are recovered. 
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4. S.H. Bennion shall be entitled to receive, subject 
to royalty or similar obligations, his share of production from 
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to his interest in the subject 
drilling unit after the consenting owners have recovered from 
S.H. Bennion's share of production the following: 
(a) 100% of S.H. Bennion's share as non-
consenting owner of the cost of surface 
equipment beyond the well head connections plus 
100% of the non-consenting owners share of the costs 
of operation of the well commencing with the first 
production and continuing until the consenting owners 
have retrieved these costs; 
(b) 175% of that portion of the costs and 
expenses of staking the location, well-side 
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling, re-
working, deepening, or plugging back, testing, com-
pleting, and the cost of equipment in the well after 
deducting any cash contributions received by the 
consenting owners; and 
(c) Interest on these amounts is to be 
assessed at the amount of the prime lending rate as 
periodically determined by Citibank of New York, NA, 
plus two percentage points, 
(d) S.H. Bennion's interest not currently 
being subject to lease or other contract development 
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of oil and gas, S.H. Bennion is entitled to receive 
as royalty, the average landowner's royalty 
attributable to each tract within the subject 
drilling unit, effective as of the date prior to the 
commencement of the drilling of the well on the subject 
drilling unit. 
5. To the extent that any previous order of the Board 
is inconsistent with this order, those orders are hereby vacated 
to the extent of such inconsistency. 
6. The Board retains exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction over all matters covered by this order and over all 
the parties affected thereby and particularly reserves exclusive 
and continuing jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate 
and as authorized by statute and regulation. 
DATED this P y O day of S^€^4-gj^ L&W , 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH 
OARD OF OIL, GAS^AND MINING 
JAMES W. CARTER 
ACTING CHAIRMAN 
Exhibit B to Addendum 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
2N AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE HATTER OF THE APPLICATION ) 
OF S. H. BENHION FOR AN ORDER ) 
POOLING INTEREST IN THE DRILLING ) ORDER 
UNIT COMPRISED OF SECTION 1, ) 
TOKNSHIP 2 SOUTH OF RANGE 5 VEST, ) Cause No. 139-13 
UIKTAE SPECIAL MERIDIAN, DUCHESNE ) 
COUNTY, UTAH ) 
) 
This cause cane on for hearing before the Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, the State 
of Utah, at 10:00 a.m., on Thursday, July 26, 1979, in the 
Executive Conference Room, Boliday 2nn, 1659 Nest North Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, pursuant to the Amended Application of 
S. H. Bennion (•Bennion-) and to notice to all interested par-
ties duly and regularly given by the Board, to consider forced 
pooling of the uncommitted interest of Bennion in the above-
captioned'drilling unit, and other matters ae set forth in the 
Amended Application -and Notice -of Hearing. 
The following members of the Board were present: 
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman 
Edward T. Beck 
C. Ray Juvelin 
E. Steele Melntyre 
John L. Bell 
Also present and representing the Division: 
I Cleon B. reight, Director 
A Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant 
i Frank M. Bamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer 
•vtn mm »«t &*rr m n M m 
Michael, Minder, Geological Engineer 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General 
Appearances were made as follows: 
S. H. Bennion, for himself 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion 
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Killiams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Katural Resources, State 
of Utah, on October 24, 1979, at the Wildlife Kesources Audi-
torium,* 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Board members were present: 
Charlea R. Benderson, Chairman 
John L. Bell 
C. Bay Juvelin 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Constance K. Lundberg 
Edward T. Beck 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B. Feight, Director 
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant 
Frank M. Bamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer 
Michael Minder, Geological Engineer 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General 
Appearances were made as follows: 
S. B. Bennion, for himself 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion 
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Killiams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
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This cause also came on for bearing before the Board 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Kesourees, State 
of Dtah, on December 18, 1980, at the Kildlife Kesourees Audi-
torium, 1596 Vest North Temple, Salt take City, Utah. 
The following Board members were presents 
John L. Bell, Co-Chairman 
Charles Benderson 
Thadis W. Box 
E. Steele Melntyre 
C. Kay Juvelin 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B. Feight, Director 
Bon Daniels, Coordinator 
Mike Minder, Petroleum Engineer 
Paula Frank, Secretary 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General 
Appearances were made as follows: 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion 
Lowell *irkpatrick, for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
NOW, THERFORE, the Board, having considered the 
matters presented at said hearings and the remarks and the 
stipulations of counsel, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. That due and regular notice of the time, place* 
and purpose of said hearings was given to all interested par-
ties in the form and manner and within the time required by law. 
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2. That the Board has jurisdiction over the matters 
covered by the Amended Application and all of the parties 
interested therein, and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate 
the Order hereinafter set forth. 
3. That Bennlon Is the record owner of an unleased, 
undivided one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas and min-
erals located in the HEfc SWfc and KWk Sth of Section 1, Township 
2 South, Range 5 Vest, Uintah Special Meridian, Duchesne 
County, Utah. 
4. That by Order in Cause Ho. 139-3, entered June 24, 
1971, as amended by Order in Cause No. 139-8, entered September 
20, 1972, the Board established said Section 1, Township 2 
South, Range 5 Kest, Unitah Speeial Meridian, as a drilling and 
spacing unit for the production of oil, gas, and associated 
hydrocarbons from the spaced interval described in said orders; 
that Shell Oil Company has drilled the TEW 1-1B5 veil in said 
Section 1 which is producing from said interval and is the per-
mitted veil for said drilling unit. 
5. That said Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 
Kest, Uintah Special Meridian, contains €78*2 acres? and that 
Bennlon's interest in said drilling and spacing unit is a 
2.94898% interest. 
S. That Shell is the major working interest owner and 
is the sole operator within said drilling unit? and that Shell 
is willing to let Bennlon share in the proceeds of production 
of said unit from first production. 
7. That pursuant to the Board9s Interim Order in this 
cause dated March 26, 1980, all Interests in the drilling unit 
comprised of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 Kest, Uintah 
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Special Meridian, in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County, 
Utah, were pooled for the development and operation of said 
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights, 
effective at 6t00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979. 
8, That Bennion's proportionate share of the net rev-
enue from the production of the subject well up to 6:00 a.m.. 
Mountain Daylight tine on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41 which 
consists of the following! 
Working Interest Accumulations 
Revenue 
Oil 1101,608.86 
Gas 3,482.23 
Total 105,091.09 
Expenditures 47,203.16 
NET $57,887.93 
Royalty Interest Accumulations* 
Oil $13,872.44 
Cas 462.04 
Total $14,334.48 
Total Accumulations 
Working Interest $57,887.93 
loyalty Interest 14.334.48 
Total $72,222.41 
('Based on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately re* 
duced, until payout* Upon payout this royalty verges with and 
is included in the working interest.) 
9. That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this 
cause dated March 26, 1980, Shell paid the Division of Oil, Gas, 
and Mining the sun of $72,222.41 which sum was placed in a 
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six-month money market certificate as directed by counsel for 
Bennion and Shell* that the original certificate earned inter-
est in the amount of $3,917•C9i and that the original sum and 
interest were invested in a new certificate which bears inter-
est at the rate of 13.519% and will mature on May 6, 1981. 
10. That Bennion has conducted an audit of Shell's 
records relating to the subject well at Shell's offices in 
Houston, Texas, and has submitted a report relating to such 
audit to the Board. 
11. That it is the practice of the Industry to con-
duct an audit of an operator's records at the office where the 
operator maintains such records? and that there are standard 
accounting procedures in the industry relating to such audits. 
ORDER 
IT ZS THEREFORE ORDERED BY TEE BOARD: 
1. That all interests in the drilling unit comprised 
of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Dintah Special 
Meridian, in the Xltamont Field of Duchesne County, Dtah, .be and 
the same are pooled for the development and operation of said 
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights, 
effective at 6*00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979. 
2. That the TEW 1-1B5 well located in said Section 1 
is the permitted well for said drilling unit. 
3* That Bennion is entitled to receive from Shell 
Bennion's proportionate share of production of oil, gas liq-
uids, and natural gas in-kind produced from the subject well 
from and after €:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979, 
upon payment of Bennion's proportionate share of the monthly 
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operating expense of said veil; that Shall will tender fiennion 
invoices for his proportionate share of the monthly operating 
expense in the same manner and in the same detail as if Bennion 
had signed the Operating Agreement in effect for aaid unit; 
that in the event Bennion fails to pay his proportionate share 
of the monthly operating expense within IS days of invoice. 
Shell shall have a first and preferred lien on Bennion*s inter-
est in production and shall be entitled to withhold the amount 
of said production in an amount equal to Bennion1 s share of the 
operating expense plus interest at the prevailing rate until 
such payment is received; and that should such default continue 
for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of invoice, Shell 
shall be entitled to retain Bennion's proportionate ahare of 
production to the extent of Shell9a lien or to tender the pro-
duction withheld pursuant to Shell's lien to Bennion and pursue 
other available legal remedies. 
4. That Bennion's interest in said drilling unit is a 
2.948981 interest. 
5. That Bennion is not entitled to share in production 
occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time on July 26, 
1979, in-kind but is entitled to share in the proceeds of such 
production; that the amount to which Bennion is entitled with 
respect to production occurring prior to 6:00 a.m.. Mountain 
Daylight time on July 26, 1979, ia $72,222.41; and that the Board 
shall transfer ownership of the money market certificate purchased 
pursuant to the Interim Order dated March 26, 1980, to Bennion. Zn 
addition. Shell shall pay Bennion the sum of $2,504.00, represent-
ing interest at 6 percent ptz annum on Bennion'a statutory royalty 
interest for the period from first production until the purchase 
of the original money market certificate. 
6. That any further audit of Shell's records relating 
to the subject drilling unit which Bennion wishes to conduct 
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shall be performed at Bennionfs expense at the location at which 
such records are kept; and that any such audit shall be con* 
ducted pursuant to the accounting procedures of the industry. 
DATED this 3?" day of $}*»*£. , 1981. 
V 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
Charges R. Henderson, Chairman 
r:i*f:d£'. 
ESffi^ 
rd T. Becif J 
John I. Bell 
/ 
Thadis W. Box 
E. Steele ttclntyre WMWwr, 
Rober\ R. Norman \ 
Margaret Bird 
•a. 
Exhibit C to Addendum 
BEFORE TEE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF KATDRAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN TEE TATTER OF THE AMENDED 
PETITION OF ANR LIMITED INC., 
ET AL. FOR AN ORDER MODIFYING 
PREVIOUS ORDERS WHICH 
ESTABLISHED DRILLING AND 
SPACING UNITS AND ANY OTHER 
ORDERS RELATING TO TEST WELLS 
FOR -THE "ALTAMONT, BLUEBELL 
AND '.CEDAR -RIM-SINK DRAW 
FIELDS, DUCHESNE .AND UINTAH' 
COUNTIES, UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Docket No. 85-DC7 
Cause No. 139-42 
Pursuant t o the Amended Not ice of Bearing dated March 
4 , 1S85 of the Board of Oi l , Gas and Mining ("Board"), Department 
of Natural Resources of the S ta te of Utah, sa id cause came on for 
hearing on Thursday, April 1 1 , 1985 at 10:00 a.m. in the Beard 
Room of the D i v i s i o n of O i l , Gas and Mining ("Div i s ion") , 355 
West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, S u i t e 3 0 1 , S a l t Lake City, 
Utah. 
The fo l lowing members of t h e Board vere present : 
Gregory P. Wil l iams, Chairman 
James W. Carter 
Charles R. Eenderson 
Richard B. Larson 
E. S t e e l e Kclntyre 
John K. Garr, having recused himsel f , 
did not p a r t i c i p a t e 
Mark C. Koench, Ass i s tan t Attorney General, was present 
on behalf of the Board. 
Members of the Staff of the Division present and 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the hearing included: 
Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director 
Ronald J . F i r t h , Associate Director 
John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer 
Barbara W. Roberts, Ass i s tan t Attorney General , was 
present on behalf of the Divis ion. 
Appearances were made as fo l lows: P e t i t i o n e r s AMR 
Limited, £l £!•$ by Frank Douglass, Esq. and Ray H. Langenberg, 
Austin, Texas; Robert G. P r u i t t , J r . , Esq. , Sa l t Lake City, Utah; 
Frank J . Gustin, Esq. , Sa l t Lake City, Utah; Louis A. Posekany, 
J r . , General Counsel, and George W. Eellstrom, Esq. , ANR 
Production Company; P h i l l i p K. Chat t in , General Counsel, Otex Oil 
Company; Hugh C. Garner, Esq. , for Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation; 
P h i l l i p William Lear# Esq. , for P h i l l i p s Petroleum Company; 
Jeffrey R. Young, Esq., for Bow Valley Petroleum, I n c . ; B. J . 
Levis , Esq. , Vice Pres ident , and Robert W. Adkins, Esq . , Linxaar 
Energy Corporation; Robert Buet tner , Esq. f Koch Exploration 
Company; Lane Jamison, Esq. , Sonat Explorat ion Company; Victor 
Brown and Robert Brown, Utah Royalty Associa t ion; John Harja, 
Esq. , Gulf Oil Corporation; Martin Seneca, General Counsel, Dte 
Indian T r ibe ; Assad M. Raffoul, Petroleum Engineer, Bureau of 
Land Management; John Chasel, on h i s own behalf; George Morris, 
Esq.r Ute Di s t r ibu t ion Corporation; Dr. Gilbert Mil ler, 
Conservation Superintendent, Amarada Bess Corporation; end L*. A. 
Pike, Roosevelt , Utah, landowner. 
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Now therefore, the Board having considered the 
testimony of the witnesses, John C. Osmond, Petroleum Geologist; 
Clarke Gillespie, Petroleum Reservoir Engineer; and R. Thayne 
Robson, Economist, for Petitioners and B. J. Lewis, Vice 
President, and John W. Clark, Petroleum Engineer, for Linmar 
Energy Corporation, and the exhibits received at said hearing and 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FTWPTMfiS OP PACT 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and 
purpose of the hearing was given to a l l interested parties as 
recuirec by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
2. The Board has jur isdict ion over the matters covered 
by said notice and over a l l part ies interested therein and has 
jurisdict ion to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set 
forth. 
3 . The Board has heretofore entered 640 acre dri l l ing 
and spacing orders for the Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation in' 
Causes No. 139-3, 139-4, 139-5, 139-8, and 1.39-17 (Altaaont 
F ie ld) , Causes No. 131-11, 131-14, 131-24, 131-27, 131-32, 131-
33, 131-34, 131-45 and 131-55, (Bluebell F i e ld ) , and Causes No. 
140-6 and 140-7 (Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Field) as to the following 
described lands: 
DINT AH SPECIAL MERIDIAN 
Township 1 Northr fiarqp 1 WfBt 
Sections: 19-36 
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Township 1 Worth. Sana* 9 W P ^ 
Sections: 19-36 
Township 1 North . Psnge 3 West 
Sections 23-26, 35 and 36 
Township 1 South. Panne 1 East 
Sections: All (except Roosevelt Unit) 
Township 1 South'. Panoe 9 East 
Sections: 4-8,18-19, 30-31 
Township 1 South. Range 1 West 
Sect ions : All (except Roosevelt Unit) 
Township 1 South . Panoe 1 through 4 West 
Sect ions : All 
Township 1 South. Pence 5 West 
Sect ions: 10-17, 20-36 
Township 1 South . Pane* fi West 
Sect ions : 25-26, 35-36 
Township ? South. Panqe 1 through 9 Pas t 
Sect ions : All 
Township 7 South. Ranoe 1 through 6 West 
Sect ions : All 
Township 7 South. Panoe 7 West 
Sect ions : 19, 30-36 
Township 9 South . Panoe ft West 
Sections: 23-26, 31-36 
Township 3 South. Ranee 3 West 
Sect ions : 5-8, 17-20, 29-32 
Township 3 South . Panqe 4 through ft West 
Sections:- All 
Township 4 South. Panqe 3 West 
Sections: 5 and 6 
Township 4 South . Panqe 4 West 
Sections: 1-6 
Township 4 South. Panqe 5 West 
Sections: 1-6 
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TnwnsMo A South. Paneo 6 Most 
S e c t i o n s : 1-18 
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
TownsMp 5 South. 'RanOP 19 East 
S e c t i o n s : 2 0 - 2 3 , 26-29, 3 2 - 3 5 
Township 6 South . Range 19 Fas t 
Sections: 3-5 , 9 , 10 , 15 , 16, 22, 27 
and 34 
4. In Cause No. 140-12, the Board authorized the 
dr i l l ing of t e s t or second v e i l s that may only be produced 
alternatively vith the i n i t i a l v e i l on the same dr i l l ing unit . 
5 . The Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation underlying 
tne subject f i e l d s constitutes a pool as that term i s defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-2(9) (1953, as amended), and i s a highly 
complex ser ies of isolated and discontinuous beds of productive 
rock that are randomly distributed ver t i ca l ly over a several 
thousand feet thick interval . Normally, the productive beds are 
separate and d i s t inc t and not in communication with each other. 
6. Many of the productive beds are not correlatable 
from v e i l to v e i l and v i l l not afford communication betveen v e i l s 
AS close as 1000 f ee t . Of the productive beds that correlate, 
various geological factors prevent a s ignif icant number form 
communicating betveen v e i l s within the same sect ion. 
7. Geologic and engineering information from i n i t i a l 
unit v e i l s and t e s t v e i l s shov that a s ingle well v i l l not 
e f fect ive ly drain the recoverable o i l and gas underlying any 
given 640 acre spacing unit because the productive beds are too 
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small or have other l imiting characterist ics precluding effect ive 
and eff ic ient drainage of the recoverable reserves underlying the 
unit . 
8. Data from production logs and f i e l d performance 
show that t e s t v e i l s dri l led under the Order in Cause No* 140-12 
after 1978 have caused the.recovery of substantial amounts of o i l 
from separate and dis t inct productive beds and from previously 
uncepleted productive beds, and that the dr i l l ing of additional 
v e i l s on exist ing units v i l l increase the ultimate recovery of 
o i l from the subject f i e l d s . 
9. The prohibition of simultaneous production from the 
i n i t i a l ve i l and t e s t ve i l on the same unit has caused the 
shutting in of v e i l s v i th the potential to produce substantial 
amounts of additional reserves. 
10. Each additional v e i l dr i l l ed under th i s order v i l l 
tap producing formations that are separate and d i s t inct from and 
not in communication vith any other producing formation and i s 
not an unnecessary v e i l . 
11 . In some areas of the subject f i e l d s , geologic, 
engineering, and economic factors jus t i fy dr i l l ing additional 
v e i l s on exist ing units . In other areas, geologic, engineering 
and economic factors*may not jus t i fy d r i l l i n g additional v e i l s on 
exis t ing uni ts . 
rnrcrT.PSTONS OP t w 
1 . Due and regular notice of the time, place and 
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purpose of the hearing vas given to all interested parties as 
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the natters covered 
by said notice and over all parties interested therein and has 
jurisdiction to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set 
forth. 
3. The Board is authorized to modify its previous 
orders to permit additional veils to be drilled vithin 
established units under Utah Code Ann. $40-6-6(4) (1953, as 
amended). 
4. An order permitting (a) the drilling of additional 
veils on existing units as provided herein and (b) the 
simultaneous production of initial veils and additional veils 
vill prevent the vaste of hydrocarbons, prevent the drilling of 
unnecessary wells, and protect correlative rights. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
To prevent vaste of oil, gas and associated liquid 
hydrocarbons, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary veils, to 
protect correlative rights and to maintain, to the maximum extent 
practicable, drilling units of uniform size and shape for the 
promotion of more orderly development of the lands described in 
Finding of Fact No. 3 above, the following order is hereby 
promulgated to govern operations in said area effective as of 
April 12, 1985": 
A. Upon the effective date any and all orders of the 
Board heretofore promulgated which are inconsistent with the 
orders herein set forth shall be and are hereby vacated to the 
extent inconsistent herewith. 
B. Additional wells may be drilled, completed, and 
produced on established drilling units comprising government 
surveyed sections of approximately 640 acres (or other designated 
drilling units so long as such unit is at least 400 acres in 
size) to a density of no greater than two producing wells on each 
unit comprising a section (or other designated unit)• 
C. Additional wells may be drilled at the option of 
the operator of the unit, based upon geologic and engineering 
data for that unit which will justify the drilling of an 
additional well in order to recover additional oil, provided the 
additional well appears to be economically feasible. 
D. Economically feasible means that a prudent operator 
would have a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of 
drilling, completing, producing and operating the well, plus a 
reasonable profit. 
£. Jt Is not the intent of .this jDrder, .in permitting 
additional wells to be drilled on established drilling units, to 
change or amend the existing contractual rights or relationships, 
express or implied, of any parties who share in production or the 
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area. 
F. Any additional veil must be located at least 1,320 
feet from the existing well on'the unit and not closer than 660 
8-
feet from the exterior boundary of the unit. Ko tvo v e i l s may be 
dril led in any drill ing unit vithin the same governmental quarter 
section or equivalent lo t . 
G. If an operator e lects to i n i t i a l l y complete a veil 
solely vithin producing formations that are separate and distinct 
from and not in communication vith any other producing formation, 
the operator v i l l use reasonable precautions in order that such 
ve i l i s not completed in any producing formation that may be 
effectively drained by any other v e i l . 
E. . Second or test v e i l s dril led under previous orders 
as ve i l as additional ve i l s to be dril led under this order may be 
produced simultaneously vith in i t i a l v e i l s . 
I . The Board retains exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction of a l l matters covered by th i s order and of al l 
parties affected thereby and particularly that the Board retains 
and reserves exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to make 
further orders as appropriate and authorized by statute and 
applicable regulations. 
ENTERED this_Z2zrday x>f A v r, f . 1985. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MIKING 
SRSFTTWZ LLIAMSf Chairman 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARK C MOENCH • 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Exhibit D to Addendum 
40-6-6. Drilling units — Establishment — Pooling of inter-
ests — Order — Operation. 
(1) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order the establishment of 
drilling units covering any pool. All such orders shall be made upon terms and 
conditions that are just and reasonable. Drilling units shall be of uniform size 
and shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that it must make an 
exception due to geologic or geographic or other factors. When necessary the 
board may divide any pool into zones and establish drilling units for each 
zone, which units may differ in size and shape from those established in any 
other zone. The order shall include: 
(a) the acreage to be embraced within each drilling unit and the shape 
of each drilling unit as determined by the board but the unit shall not be 
smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically 
drained by one well; and 
(b) the direction that no more than one well shall be drilled for produc-
tion from the common source of supply on any drilling unit, and the 
authorized location of the well. 
(2) The board may modify the order to provide an exception to the autho-
rized location of the well when the board finds such a modification to be 
reasonably necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool shall cover all lands 
determined by the board to be underlaid by the pool, and the order may be 
modified by the board to include additional areas determined to be underlaid 
by the pool. 
(4) After an order fixing drilling units has been entered by the board, the 
drilling of any well into the pool at a location other than authorized by the 
order, is prohibited. The operation of any well drilled in violation of an order 
fixing drilling units is prohibited. The board may modify the order to decrease 
or increase the size of the drilling units or permit additional wells to be drilled 
within the established units. 
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may pool their interests for 
the development and operation of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pool-
ing, the board may enter an order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for 
the development and operation. The order shall be made upon terms and 
conditions that are just and reasonable. Operations incident to the drilling of 
a well upon any portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be deemed 
for all purposes to be the conduct of the operations upon each separately 
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That portion of the production 
allocated or applicable to each tract included in a unit covered by a pooling 
order shall, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to have been produced 
from each tract by a well drilled thereon. 
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and operation of a well on 
the drilling unit by any owner within the drilling unit, and shall provide for 
the payment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for supervision and 
storage facilities, as provided in this subsection. 
In relation to each owner who refuses to agree to bear his proportionate 
share of the costs of the drilling and operation of the well (the nonconsenting 
owner), the order shall provide for reimbursement to the owner paying for the 
drilling and operation of the well (consenting owners) for the nonconsenting 
owner's share of the costs out of, and only out of, production from the unit 
attributable to his tract. The board is authorized to provide that the consent-
ing owners shall own and be entitled to receive all production from the well, 
applicable to each tract or interest, and obligations payable out of production, 
until the consenting owners have been paid the amount due under the terms 
of the pooling order or order relating to the drilling unit. In the event of any • 
dispute as to such costs, the board shall determine the proper costs. The order 
shall provide that each consenting owner shall be entitled to receive, subject 
to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production of the well appli-
cable to his interest in the unit, and, unless he has agreed otherwise, his 
proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share of such production until 
costs are recovered as provided in this subsection; and that each nonconsent-
ing owner shall be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations, 
the share of production from the well applicable to his interest in the unit 
after the consenting owners have recovered from the nonconsenting owner's * 
share of production the following: 
(a) In respect to every such well 100% of the nonconsenting owner's 
share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the wellhead connections 
(including, but not limited to, stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping 
equipment, and piping), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of 
the cost of operation of the well commencing with first production and 
continuing until the consenting owners have recovered these costs, it 
being intended that the nonconsenting owner's share of these costs and 
equipment will be that interest which would have been chargeable to the 
nonconsenting owner had he initially agreed to pay his share of the costs 
of the well from the beginning of the operation; and 
(b) An amount to be determined by the board but not less than 150% 
nor to exceed 200% of that portion of the costs and expenses of staking the 
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, rework-
ing, deepening or plugging back, testing, and completing, and the cost of 
equipment in the well (to and including the wellhead connections), after 
deducting any cash contributions received by the consenting owners. A 
reasonable interest charge may be included if the board finds it appropri-
ate. 
(7) The order shall provide that: 
(a) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which tract is 
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas, 
shall have the costs provided in Subsection (6) paid from the production 
attributable to that tract. Any royalty interest or other interest not liable 
for the costs of production shall be paid by the nonconsenting owner and 
not from the production attributable to the tract until the consenting 
owners have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6). 
(b) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which is not 
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas, 
shall receive as a royalty the average landowners royalty attributable to 
each tract within the drilling unit, determined prior to the commence-
ment of drilling and payable from the production allocated to each tract 
until the consenting owners have recovered the costs as provided in Sub-
section (6). 
(8) The operator of a well under a pooling order in which there are noncon-
senting owners shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly state-
ments of all costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil or gas produced, 
and the amount of proceeds realized from the sale of this production during 
the preceding month. If and when the consenting owners recover from a non-
consenting owner's relinquished interest the amounts provided for in Subsec-
tion (6) of this section, the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner 
shall automatically revert to him; and the nonconsenting owner shall from 
that time own the same interest in the well and the production from it, and be 
liable for the further costs of the operation as if he had participated in the 
initial drilling and operation. These costs are payable out of production unless 
otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting owner and the operator. 
History: C. 1953, 40-6-6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 205, § 1. 
